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Abstract 
 
The human infant brain is the only known machine able to master a natural language and develop 
explicit, symbolic, and communicable systems of knowledge that deliver rich representations of the external 
world. With the emergence of non-invasive brain imaging, we now have access to the unique neural 
machinery underlying these early accomplishments. After describing early cognitive capacities in the 
domains of language and number, we review recent findings that underline the strong continuity between 
human infants’ and adults’ neural architecture, with notably early hemispheric asymmetries and 
involvement of frontal areas. Studies of the strengths and limitations of early learning, and of brain 
dynamics in relation to regional maturational stages, promise to yield a better understanding of the sources 
of human cognitive achievements. 
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Abstract 
 
The human infant brain is the only known machine able to master a natural 
language and develop explicit, symbolic, and communicable systems of knowledge that 
deliver rich representations of the external world. With the emergence of non-invasive 
brain imaging, we now have access to the unique neural machinery underlying these early 
accomplishments. After describing early cognitive capacities in the domains of language 
and number, we review recent findings that underline the strong continuity between 
human infants’ and adults’ neural architecture, with notably early hemispheric 
asymmetries and involvement of frontal areas. Studies of the strengths and limitations of 
early learning, and of brain dynamics in relation to regional maturational stages, promise 
to yield a better understanding of the sources of human cognitive achievements. 
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The remarkable and complex cognitive functions observed in humans do not 
suddenly emerge in adulthood but are shaped by two decades of development. After 
centuries of considering infants’ mental life as either empty or confused, research in 
cognitive development has repeatedly shown considerable cognitive competencies in the 
first months of life, despite infants’ highly limited motor behavior. This set of early 
capacities projects human infants on a learning pathway beyond the pathways available to 
other animals. This pathway already bears some of the hallmarks of learning and 
cognition in human adults. In some domains, such as language, human infants are even 
better learners than adults. In other domains, such as numerical cognition, infants lag far 
behind adults in the extended process of developing knowledge of mathematics, but are 
already beginning to build a path leading from a set of core capacities shared with other 
animals to uniquely human, abstract knowledge. The neural architecture underlying these 
early capacities has long been out of reach, but this is no longer the case, thanks to the 
development of non-invasive brain imaging techniques permitting careful comparisons of 
the brain’s functional architecture in human infants, human adults, and non-human 
animals. Such comparisons promise to shed light on the key elements underlying human 
cognitive achievements. 
 
Language in infancy 
Language is the paragon of human cognitive sophistication, and it is certainly 
from this domain that many of the best examples of human infants’ early competencies 
can be drawn. Many of these capacities have been discovered only recently, because 
verbal production develops slowly: After a stage of vocalization, then babbling, human 
infants commonly produce their first words at the end of the first year, and they produce 
multiword utterances with a substantial vocabulary only at about two years of age. 
Carefully designed experiments have shown, however, that infants’ receptive capacities 
are substantially better than their production and present three crucial features. First, long 
before any effective language production, infants are sensitive to the particular vocal 
sounds and combinations used by their native language to create words and sentences. 
They recognize their native language prosody at birth (Mehler et al., 1988) and establish 
the phonetic repertoire of their language during the first year of life, starting with 
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sensitivity to the vowels of their native language (Kuhl et al., 1992) and progressing to 
consonants (Werker and Tees, 1984) and then to the combinations of phonemes allowed 
in native words (Jusczyk et al., 1994). These findings illustrate the adept and progressive 
analyses of the different levels of speech organization that allow infants to discover and 
learn familiar speech patterns. 
A second line of competencies concerns infants’ ability to infer the abstract 
structure of speech. Infants rapidly become sensitive to word categories, storing the most 
frequent function words of their native language by 6 months (Shi et al., 2006b) and 
using the higher frequency of some syllables in an artificial speech stream to parse the 
stream at 7 months (Bernard and Gervain, 2012). By 12 months, function words and 
grammatical suffixes have a different status for infants than open-class words and 
morphemes (Shi, 2014). Before they produce fully grammatical sentences, 24-month-old 
toddlers analyze the syntactic structure of sentences and display ‘‘error’’ event-related 
responses when the sentences are ungrammatical (Bernal et al., 2010; Oberecker and 
Friederici, 2006). 
Finally, a third line of early competencies crucial for language acquisition has 
been reported: long before they speak, infants begin to connect words to the things to 
which they refer. Around 6 months, infants begin to understand some content words that 
refer to people (e.g., ‘‘mommy,’’ ‘‘daddy’’), objects (e.g., ‘‘bottle,’’ ‘‘foot’’), and action 
verbs (e.g., ‘‘hug,’’ ‘‘eat’’). When images of two objects (e.g., a foot and an apple) are 
presented side by side on a computer screen, 6-month-old infants look more to the object 
named by their mother in a sentence such as ‘‘Where is the X, look at the X’’ than to the 
other object (Bergelson and Swingley, 2012; Tincoff and Jusczyk, 1999, 2012); by the 
end of the first year of life, they understand about 50 words (Fenson et al., 1994). In the 
lab, infants associate words with visual shapes at 4 months (e.g., ‘‘bubu’’ with a curvy 
shape; ‘‘kiki’’ with an angular shape; Ozturk et al., 2013); by 6 months, they extract a 
nonce word from a sentence using prosodic and statistical cues and map it on a visual 
referent (Shukla et al., 2011). More generally, verbal labeling facilitates object 
categorization: after several exemplars of a category (dinosaurs or fishes) are presented to 
3-month-old infants, the infants respond with greater attention to a new dinosaur or fish if 
it does not belong in the familiar category, provided that each of the familiar members of 
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the category was accompanied by the same verbal label. Interestingly, verbal labels are 
more efficient in this task than tones and backward speech for these young infants (Ferry 
et al., 2010). Verbal labeling also aids 14-month-old infants’ ability to hold 
representations of objects in working memory (Feigenson and Halberda, 2008). Thus, 
language begins early to foster human infants’ processing of information about the 
surrounding world. 
At the end of the second year, toddlers can exploit the relations between words 
and things to learn aspects of the grammar of their language. In one experiment (Lany 
and Saffran, 2010), toddlers first listened to 32 sentences composed of four nonce words 
(e.g., ‘‘erd deech ush coomo’’) coming from two lists. One list consisted of monosyllabic 
nonce words always preceded by the syllables (‘‘ong’’ or ‘‘erd,’’ e.g., ‘‘ong deech’’); the 
second list consisted of bisyllabic nonce words preceded by ‘‘alt’’ or ‘‘ush’’ (e.g., ‘‘ush 
coomo’’). Then, six different pictures of animals or vehicles were presented, such that 
words in each category were consistently associated with one list (e.g., animals with the 
bisyllabic words). The toddlers were subsequently surprised (i.e., looked longer at the 
image) when an image was incorrectly associated with a word from the other list (a 
vehicle with a bisyllabic word in our example). This was not the case in a control group, 
for whom the only difference was that the syllables were inconsistently associated with 
the mono- or bisyllabic words during the initial presentation of the sentences. Once 
infants learned the conditions of application of the four syllables that preceded the nonce 
words, therefore, they were able to match these two complementary categories to visual 
categories. This example illustrates the versatility of infants’ distributional analyses and 
their fast mapping of words to objects in different conceptual domains. A similar 
mechanism may underlie the matching of nouns to objects and of verbs to actions, 
because objects and actions are conceptually distinct, and nouns and verbs have 
complementary associations with the specific syllables representing articles and 
pronouns. 
 
Mechanisms Underlying Early Language Learning 
 All these laboratory experiments are conducted in a few minutes, with no 
pretraining. They therefore reveal competencies that are readily available for language 
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learning and cognitive development. Two main mechanisms have been proposed to 
explain infants’ successes: statistical analyses of speech input and sensitivity to abstract 
patterns. A succession of experiments, beginning with the landmark study of Saffran et 
al. (1996), has demonstrated infants’ powerful abilities to discover statistical properties of 
speech and thereby to uncover the phonetic inventory of their native language (Maye et 
al., 2002), to segment the continuous speech stream into words (Bortfeld et al., 2005; 
Ngon et al., 2013; Saffran et al., 1996), to establish long-distance relations between 
syllables (Friederici et al., 2011; Kabdebon et al., 2015), and to infer both the 
grammatical categories of words (Hochmann et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2006a) and word 
meanings (Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007). 
Some of these capacities have also been reported in animals (e.g., tamarins 
[Hauser et al., 2001] and rats [Toro and Tobalon, 2005]), demonstrating the universality 
of distributional analyses. What is remarkable in human infants, however, is the 
simultaneous efficiency of these analyses at different levels of the speech hierarchy and 
the particular combination of speech cues that young children use. For example, to 
construct the closed-class word category, infants must note the co-occurrence of syllables 
sharing specific acoustic properties (low intensity, short duration, weak stress, particular 
distributions of phonemes) and their reproducible positions in prosodic domains. 
Children also associate the statistical structure of visual objects (cf. dinosaurs in Ferry et 
al., 2010) with the recovery of high-frequency speech events embedded in particular 
frame contexts (Mintz, 2003; Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007). 
The strengths and limitations of infants’ statistical learning suggest how speech 
input is channeled in the infant brain, because the computational possibilities are framed 
by the neural architecture. For example, infants discover words in a speech stream only 
within a limited set of prosodic domains (Shukla et al., 2007) and only when statistical 
structure is weighted against other speech cues (Johnson and Seidl, 2009). Thus, the 
different levels of the prosodic hierarchy may correspond to different neural units. The 
superior temporal region, organized in areas of progressively longer temporal windows, 
is a likely substrate for this processing hierarchy (Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2006). The 
precise description of the characteristics of speech statistical analyses in infants, together 
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with increasingly realistic models of human infants’ functional architecture, thus may 
inform models of language acquisition. 
Another mechanism of language acquisition has been proposed by Marcus et al. 
(1999): 7-month-old infants are sensitive to the abstract pattern underlying syllable 
triplets. In this experiment, after a short familiarization with trisyllabic words sharing the 
same structure (aab, immediate repetition of the first syllable, or aba, delayed repetition 
of the first syllable after an intervening syllable), infants discriminated the two types of 
words over variation in the specific syllables presented. Because infants generalized their 
learning to new syllables, these findings were interpreted as showing infants’ sensitivity 
to algebraic patterns. Subsequent research has revealed that infants’ algebraic capacities 
might be limited at first to the detection of immediate repetitions (Endress et al., 2009), 
but their sensitivity to repetition can apply to abstract representations. In particular, 7-
month-old infants can learn a hierarchical organization of repetitive structures (Kovacs 
and Endress, 2014). In this experiment, infants first listened to sentences composed of 
three trisyllabic words, each word being either of the type aba or abb. These words were 
organized in a sentence with an ABB structure, for example aba abb abb, such that the 
two distinct words at the end of the sentence shared the same repetitive structure. When 
subsequently presented with sentences in which words were now organized with an AAB 
structure (abb abb aba), infants detected the second-order change in the repetitive 
structure, looking longer to the speaker when it played the new type of sentence. 
Although they detected the second-order regularity only when the repeated words 
comprised adjacent repetition (they failed for abb aba aba sentences), this study reveals 
that infants have access to embedded structures during the first year of life. Once again, 
speech seems to have a special status, as 5-month-old infants fail to detect algebraic 
patterns in nonlinguistic material (e.g., tones and visual shapes) unless this material is 
preceded by words sharing the same structure (Marcus et al., 2007). 
The ability to detect algebraic patterns associated with the use of labels for 
categories of objects points to the possibility that human infants might have access to 
symbolic representations and recursive rules. Human adults commonly use symbolic 
systems (e.g., speech, numbers, writing codes, algebraic formulae) to represent aspects of 
the external world, and we easily and flexibly map symbols to objects and vice versa. Our 
  8 
‘‘symbolic minds’’ might depend on species-unique aspects of human neural 
architecture, in particular the expansion of associative cortical areas and the development 
of new long-distance fiber tracts, such as the arcuate fasciculus (Rilling et al., 2008). 
More efficient connections to and from the frontal lobes and longer memory buffers may 
lead to the discovery of more abstract structures, enabling humans to represent the 
external world with a symbolic system.  
This possibility raises questions for studies of human brain and cognitive 
development. When is the maturation of this architecture sufficient to support symbolic 
representations in infants? At what age do infants spontaneously and efficiently use 
symbols to gain access to abstract concepts? Before asking whether and how the infant 
brain supports such symbolic functions, let us take a look at another talent shown by 
human infants that is deeply linked to language and symbols at older ages: numerical 
cognition. 
 
Numerical Cognition	
 The system of natural number concepts is unique to humans (Dehaene, 2008) and 
likely universal across human cultures (Dehaene et al., 2008), but it is not expressed until 
middle childhood, at ages ranging from as low as four to as high as ten years, in research 
testing children in different cultures (e.g., Carey, 2009; Piantadosi et al., 2014). The roots 
of this system nevertheless can be discerned both in newborn human infants and in 
animals of diverse species. Both infants and animals represent number abstractly, albeit 
imprecisely. For example, human newborns who are presented a train of sequences of 4 
or 12 different syllables (e.g., ba-ba-ba-ba, ti-ti-ti-ti, .) show reliable looking preferences 
between visual arrays of 4 vs. 12 forms: like adults who tend to look at the events we 
hear, newborn infants look longer at visual arrays that correspond in number to the 
auditory sequences (Izard et al., 2009). Because these visual and auditory arrays differed 
in modality, in format, and in a host of low-level perceptual variables, this looking 
preference provides evidence for sensitivity to abstract number. 
 Although the precision and robustness of number representations increase over 
development (Halberda and Feigenson, 2008), the numerical representations found in 
human infants have the same five properties at all ages. First, they are approximate and 
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ratio limited: newborn infants’ numerical sensitivity is apparent only when numerical 
arrays differ by a ratio between 3 and 2 (Coubart et al., 2014; Izard et al., 2009); the 
critical ratio progressively decreases with development in infancy and beyond. Second, 
they support operations of approximate addition and subtraction (McCrink and Wynn, 
2004) as well as numerical ordering and comparison (Brannon, 2002) and proportional 
reasoning (McCrink and Wynn, 2007; Xu and Garcia, 2008). Third, these representations 
are linked to representations of spatial quantities, especially length, in a form that may 
support the universal discovery and use of number lines (Dehaene et al., 2008). For 
example, newborn infants are predisposed to linking increases in the number of objects in 
an array to increases in the length of an accompanying line (de Hevia et al., 2014). 
Fourth, approximate number representations form slowly and increase in speed with 
development (Wood and Spelke, 2005). Fifth, when infants are presented with sets of 
objects, representations of approximate number compete for attention with 
representations of the individual members of the set; when presented with small numbers 
of objects, representations of the individuals often win the competition (Coubart et al., 
2014; Hyde and Spelke, 2009; Hyde and Wood, 2011), although they do not always do so 
(Starr et al., 2013b). All these signatures have been found in older children and adults as 
well as in nonhuman primates, rodents, birds, and fish (see Spelke, 2011 for review). 
Thus, representations of approximate number are present and functional throughout 
human development, and they depend on mechanisms whose evolution far precedes the 
emergence of our own species. 
Starting in the third or fourth year, children begin to learn words for numbers. The 
process of number word learning is not well understood despite intense study (compare 
Carey, 2009, to Leslie et al., 2008), but it is clear that this process engages the system of 
approximate number representation that emerged in infancy. Although number words are 
used by adults to designate exact cardinal values, children’s first number words elicit 
representations of approximate numerical meanings (Pinhas et al., 2014). Moreover, 
three-year-old children’s mastery of number words is predictable from their performance, 
as six-month-old infants, in tests of nonsymbolic numerical discrimination (Starr et al., 
2013a). Both adults and children solve problems of symbolic mathematics more rapidly 
and accurately if they first are primed by a task requiring operations on nonsymbolic 
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numerical arrays (Hyde et al., 2014; Park and Brannon, 2013). These findings strongly 
suggest that our uniquely human talent for mathematics builds on ancient systems with a 
long phylogenetic and ontogenetic history (Dehaene, 2008). 
By the age of four or five, most children in industrialized countries have mastered 
the mechanics of counting and the exact meanings of number words (Carey, 2009; 
Davidson et al., 2012; Lipton and Spelke, 2005). At about the same age, children develop 
a functional concept of exact numerical equality that they can apply in the absence of any 
number words: Presented with an array of five or six objects, such children judge that the 
array will change in number if a single object is added or removed but not if one object is 
added and a different object is removed (Izard and Spelke, 2015).  In contrast, younger 
children judge that such an array will not change in size if the same individual element is 
removed and then returned to the array, but they fail to judge that it will remain the same 
size if one element is removed and a different element is added (Izard et al., 2014). This 
contrast testifies to a qualitative change in children’s numerical concepts: a change that 
some but not all investigators argue marks the emergence of the system of natural number 
(Carey, 2009; Spelke, 2011; cf. Leslie et al., 2008). 
The abstract notion of exact numerical equality develops hand in hand with 
children’s developing lexicon of words for exact numbers (J. Jara-Ettinger, S. Piantadosi, 
E.S.S., R. Levy, and E. Gibson, in revision), suggesting that mastery of the uniquely 
human system of natural number concepts is linked in some way to our uniquely human 
mastery of a natural language. In support of this suggestion, the system of natural number 
has been found in every culture of the world, including cultures with a more restricted 
numerical vocabulary than the conventional base systems that now pervade industrialized 
countries (Butterworth et al., 2008; Dehaene et al., 2008). Moreover, deaf adults who 
have spent their lives in hearing communities, with little access to a conventional 
language, lack critical aspects of the natural number system, despite exposure to Arabic 
notation in the form of money and measurement devices (Spaepen et al., 2011, 2013). 
Nevertheless, these studies do not reveal the role played by language in the emergence of 
natural number concepts or the process by which those concepts develop. 
 We have focused on one case of human cognitive development, but infants have 
remarkable abilities to gain knowledge in diverse domains. Beginning at birth, they 
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represent and learn about objects and their mechanical interactions (Baillargeon, 2004; 
Stahl and Feigenson, 2015; Valenza et al., 2006), biological motion (Simion et al., 2008), 
people (Gliga and Dehaene-Lambertz, 2007) and their actions and goals (Gergely et al., 
2002; Saxe et al., 2005; Woodward, 1998), and about abstract entities including numbers 
(Brannon, 2002; Xu and Spelke, 2000), geometrical forms and relations (Lee et al., 2012; 
Lourenco and Huttenlocher, 2008), probabilities (Te´ gla´ s et al., 2007; Xu and Garcia, 
2008), communication (Powell and Spelke, 2013; Vouloumanos et al., 2014), and mental 
states (Kova´ cs et al., 2010). In all these domains, the development of knowledge begins 
in early infancy and unfolds in a regular pattern thereafter, converging on uniquely 
human systems of knowledge that are explicit, symbolic, and communicable to others. 
 
The Promise of Studies of Infant Neural Architecture 
To summarize, human infants are able to manipulate different levels of speech 
and naturally link word units to conceptual units. They also are able to form concepts that 
develop, over the preschool years, into systems of abstract knowledge that are unique to 
humans. Finally, infants’ language and systems of knowledge develop in synchrony and 
appear, in many cases, to be closely intertwined. What leads humans, and only humans, 
on this developmental path? 
Although behavioral studies have brought important insights into infants’ early 
capacities, they provide only limited answers to the question of why only humans 
develop systems for expressing abstract concepts that are productive, explicitly 
communicable, and symbolic. Almost all of the capacities described in young human 
infants have been reported in animals, prompting enduring disputes over the sources of 
our unique achievements. These quarrels miss the point that the human infant brain is the 
only known machine able to efficiently master a natural language, and to develop systems 
of knowledge such as the natural numbers, over just four or five years of life, prior to any 
formal instruction. Careful study of the neural bases of human infants’ cognitive 
achievements promises to shed light on the specific neural architecture that supports this 
set of competencies and developments, providing new solutions to this old problem. 
We are just at the start of this research and have gained only limited information, 
because it remains difficult to image infants as they engage in a cognitive task. These 
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difficulties stem in part from the low compliance of young subjects, the impracticality of 
studies involving extensive training of infants, and the impossibility of giving verbal 
instructions. Further difficulties arise from the small size and immaturity of the infant 
brain, which affects the characteristics of MRI images and of electrical activity. Today, 
we are able to obtain structural and functional images of the human brain from the first 
stages of cognition, in prematurely born infants and even living fetuses, with 
magnetoencephalography (Draganova et al., 2005; Muenssinger et al., 2013) and fMRI 
(Fulford et al., 2003). Before describing the insights afforded by functional brain imaging 
studies, we rapidly describe structural human brain development from the last weeks of 
gestation to provide a first look at the available neural resources underlying infants’ 
cognitive capacities. 
 
A Brief History of Human Brain Development	
 Normal human gestation lasts 282 days (±13 days) post menstrual period (i.e. 40 
wGA) but prematurely born infants may survive from 28wGA, even 23wGA, facing an 
increased risk of neurological and cognitive impairment (D'Onofrio et al., 2013). During 
the last trimester of gestation, the complex gyrification of the typical human brain (figure 
1A) develops in parallel with the final migration of neurons in the cortical plate and the 
setting up of connectivity. The six-layered lamination of the cortex becomes fully visible 
after 32 wGA, and all neurons are in place at term (Burkhalter et al., 1993; Kostovic and 
Judas, 2010). Prenatal development in humans, as in other primates, is characterized by 
the expansion of the subplate zone, where migrating neurons and waiting afferent fibers 
establish numerous transient connections (Hevner, 2000; Kostovic and Judas, 2010). The 
first synapses appear in the cortical plate around 23-26 wGA, with a massive relocation 
of the afferent fibers from the subplate to the cortical plate from 28 to 32 wGA 
(Burkhalter et al., 1993; Hevner, 2000; Kostovic and Judas, 2010). A transient circuitry, 
critical in the organization of the cortex, is observed during this period : Thalamic 
afferents connect both the pioneer neurons remaining in the subplate and their target 
pyramidal cells in the cortical plate in order to amplify the input signal (Kanold and 
Luhmann, 2010). Interneurons arrive in place after the pyramidal cells they control 
(Marín-Padilla, 2011). Parvalbumin inhibitory inter-neurons, essential for learning 
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(Hensch, 2004), are not differentiated before 26wGA and develop very slowly in an 
inside-out pattern until at least 10 months of post-term age (Honig et al., 1996).  
The last trimester of pregnancy is also marked by a fast emergence of short-range 
connectivity in addition to the long-range association pathways that developed since the 
second trimester of gestation and are clearly identified with diffusion tensor imaging 
(DTI)/diffusion spectrum imaging (DSI) during the 29- to 34- wGA period (Takahashi et 
al., 2012). In primates, feedforward cortico-cortical connectivity mainly originating from 
supragranular layers develops prenatally, with an already clear specificity and thus 
minimal elimination of axonal branches later on. By contrast, feedback connectivity, 
which originates from infragranular layers, is relatively unspecific, and a protracted 
remodeling phase refines the pattern of connections after term by largely eliminating 
axonal branches (Kennedy et al., 2007). Brain areas can be ordered into a processing 
hierarchy by measuring the proportion of connections originating from the infra and 
supragranular layers. Despite the prolonged pruning of feedback connectivity, this 
hierarchy is specified prenatally in primates, in contrast to cats and rodents (Price et al., 
2006). 
 After term (Figure 1), the brain continues to grow considerably in size during the 
first two years (at a rate of about 0.4 cm of cranial perimeter per week during the first six 
months), with intense metabolic changes related to synapse formation and axonal growth 
observed across the whole brain during the first three months of life (Blu¨ ml et al., 
2013). Waves of synaptogenesis widening the cortical columns, and myelination of the 
fibers enlarging the white matter, continue at a slower pace for over two decades in 
humans, with a large heterochrony between regions and systems, although synchronized 
phenomena may also occur to orchestrate this diversity (Lidow et al., 1991). For 
example, the primary visual cortex rapidly matures during the first three months of life in 
parallel with the myelination of the optical radiations (Figure 4A), whereas maturation in 
the primary auditory cortex and acoustic radiations extends over the first three years of 
life (Yakovlev and Lecours, 1967). Frontal areas and cortico-cortical connections 
continue to mature until puberty, but myelination is already observed during the first year 
of life in all associative regions (Figure 1C). Brain maturation is not a linear process, and 
the rate of attainment of mature myelination patterns varies across regions (Kinney et al., 
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1988). Restricting maturation to synaptogenesis and myelination is certainly too simple, 
as it ignores neuronal differentiation (Honig et al., 1996), neurotransmitter modulation 
(e.g., the switch from an excitatory role of GABA in immature neurons to its classical 
inhibitory role; Ben-Ari et al., 1997), and the role of the glia. 
 
The Functional Architecture of the Developing Brain 
Mature cognition relies on a set of specialized modules, massively parallel and 
hierarchical, that progressively integrate and elaborate features of the environment in 
more and more complex and abstract representations, from low-level processors within 
primary cortices to heteromodal processors in associative cortical regions (Mesulam, 
1998). A second system of long-range connections between frontal, parietal, and 
cingulate regions forms a higher-level space or ‘‘global neuronal workspace’’ that 
interconnects these modules and maintains access to the information they provide over 
several seconds (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). 
How does this functional architecture arise? The popular view of human brain 
maturation, highlighting the faster rate of myelination and synaptogenesis in primary 
areas relative to higher-level areas, has favored bottom-up views of cognitive 
development, according to which purely sensory and reflexive infants gradually gain 
access to more and more abstract thoughts (as, for example, in the theory of Piaget, 
1952). In contrast to this picture, research during the last decade, using functional brain 
imaging techniques in healthy living infants of different ages, reveals a more complex 
pattern of neural development. This research challenges several aspects of classical 
dogma and offers new perspectives on human learning and cognitive development. We 
outline three sets of research findings, providing evidence that (1) a complex functional 
organization is in place beginning at the last trimester of gestation, (2) activity in frontal 
areas contributes to infants’ cognitive processing, and (3) left-right hemispheric 
asymmetries emerge early and prominently in human brain development. 
 
An Early Functional Organization 
At 6 months of gestation in early preterms, electroencephalography (EEG) 
recordings consist of long periods of low voltage interrupted by bursts of high-voltage 
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activity, called ‘‘trace alternant.’’ EEG becomes more continuous and left-right 
synchronized as the functional circuits become established and thalamic generators 
entrain the cortex from 35 wGA on (Wallois, 2010). Yet, the slow oscillations of the 
blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response can already be parceled into distinct 
regions, and a set of functional networks with similar topographies to those of adults has 
been isolated in infants between 26 and 43 wGA (Doria et al., 2010; Smyser et al., 2010). 
These resting-state networks are not limited to primary areas but encompass the default 
mode and executive control networks (Doria et al., 2010). These two networks, although 
initially fragmented, are adult like at term. It is noticeable that many of these networks 
consist of strong interhemispheric correlations at a time when EEG is poorly left-right 
synchronized. Future studies should explore the relation between the BOLD response and 
neural activity at this age, especially because the maturation of the vascular system and of 
the astrocytes, which mediate the relation between neural activity and the vascular 
response, is still poorly described. In any case, these studies confirm that the human adult 
functional hemodynamic repertoire has its roots during the last trimester of gestation. 
Spontaneous activity in these networks may take advantage of this functional skeleton to 
orient early learning. Moreover, the large percentage of time infants spend in active sleep 
(40%–60% of sleep time) during the end of gestation and the first year of life might be 
used to explore the possibilities offered by this functional architecture (Barttfeld et al., 
2015; Deco et al., 2011; Peirano et al., 2003). 
Research tracking infants’ brain responses to stimulation reveals an early 
channeling of information along specific pathways, rather than undifferentiated 
activations. Mismatch/priming paradigms, in which a new stimulus is introduced after a 
series of repeated stimuli, are powerful tools to explore this architecture. By manipulating 
which feature is repeated or changed and thus when and where this change is noticed, 
different levels of representation can be targeted (Dehaene-Lambertz and Dehaene, 
1994). Using this type of paradigm with event-related potentials (ERPs), research has 
revealed that infants, like adults, compute phonetic representations independently of 
nonpertinent acoustical features (Dehaene-Lambertz and Gliga, 2004). For example, a 
similar mismatch response to a change in syllables (from pa to ta) is evoked in neonates 
not only when the repeated syllables before the change are physically identical but also 
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when they are produced by different speakers (Dehaene-Lambertz and Pena, 2001). 
Furthermore, when two different dimensions of a stimulus are contrasted, such as the 
speaker’s voice and the linguistic value of the syllable in the auditory domain (Bristow et 
al., 2009) or the number of objects and their identity/shape in the visual domain (Izard et 
al., 2008), mismatch responses have similar electrical latencies but different topographies 
on 3-month-old infants’ scalp, indicating that they are generated by different brain 
sources and thereby suggesting that the studied dimensions are coded by different neural 
networks. 
 For example, Hyde et al. (2010) presented 6-month-old infants with a succession 
of arrays of objects of a particular shape and number, followed by a change in object 
shape, number, or both. By using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) to image the BOLD 
response, a reliable response to changes in number was observed in parietal areas in 
infants, relative to no-change controls and parallel to changes that were previously 
observed using fMRI in studies of adults (Piazza et al., 2004), and confirming the brain 
sources proposed from high-density ERPs in 3-month-old infants (Izard et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, a reliable brain response to changes in object shape was observed in 
occipital-temporal areas relative to no-change controls, also parallel to that observed in 
adults (Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2000; Piazza et al., 2004) and 3-month-olds (Izard et al., 
2008). These examples reveal both specificity in the brain systems supporting speech, 
number, and object processing in infants and developmental continuity in the functioning 
of those systems from infancy to adulthood. 
Distinctive functional responses are observed from the earliest ages (Figure 2). 
Thirty-week gestational age preterm neonates react to a change of consonant (/ba/ versus 
/ga/) with a large response widely recorded with NIRS over the superior temporal and 
inferior frontal regions on both sides of the brain. The response to a change of voice 
(male versus female) is limited to the right inferior frontal region (Mahmoudzadeh et al., 
2013). These results are confirmed with EEG: mismatch responses are weaker and also 
less mature for a change of voice than for a change of phoneme. Thus, from the first 
contacts with the external world, distinct features of external stimuli are processed 
through different networks. This channeling depends on the local computing properties of 
the areas and on their connectivity to sensory systems and upper regions, which we need 
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to better understand. The particular morphology of the human auditory associative areas 
(larger columns [Buxhoeveden et al., 2001] and dense short-range connectivity [Turken 
and Dronkers, 2011]) favoring the auditory processing of temporal features might be 
specified from 30 wGA, explaining preterm infants’ capacity to discriminate this difficult 
phonemic contrast. 
 
Involvement of Frontal Regions in Infants’ Cognition	
Those who view development as a progressive organization and specialization of 
the brain from low-level to higher-level regions as the brain matures often point to the 
protracted development of frontal areas, which are classically assumed to be too 
immature to be functional in infants. One of the most important results of functional brain 
imaging has been to show that this view is false. Regarding myelination, postmortem data 
have long revealed that the frontal pole myelinates before the temporal pole (Kinney et 
al., 1988). Using an index of maturation based on the MRI T2-weighted image (T2w) 
signal, Leroy et al. (2011) reported more recently that the inferior frontal regions are 
more mature than the regions bordering the superior temporal sulcus, and as mature as 
the planum temporale (Figure 1B). Resting-state networks comprise a frontal component 
from the fetal period onward (Doria et al., 2010; Smyser et al., 2010), and studies using 
stimulation report robust activations in this lobe, even in preterm neonates (Figure 2; 
Mahmoudzadeh et al., 2013). 
 Moreover, the frontal lobes do not respond as a global whole but rather involve 
distinct areas depending on the task (Figure 3): for example, distinct responses to the 
mother’s and to an unknown female voice are observed in the median prefrontal and 
orbitofrontal areas (Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2010), similar to activations to 
familiar/unfamiliar stimuli in adults (Roy et al., 2012). Long-term memory of the 
prosodic contours of the native language is accompanied by activation of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal region in relation to the inferior parietal region, the locus of the phonological 
store in adults (Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2002), whereas significant responses are 
measured in the inferior frontal regions when working memory is elicited (Dehaene-
Lambertz et al., 2006). This huge lobe is thus parceled into distinct functional regions 
that play distinct roles in infants’ cognition. 
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The early involvement of frontal regions might be crucial to explaining human 
learning. As proposed by Tenenbaum et al. (2011), hierarchical predictive models may 
simultaneously learn at different levels, if the learner is equipped with multiple embedded 
spaces of hypotheses. Such models are especially fast for learning abstractions from 
sparse data, with a faster learning curve at the higher level because they pool evidence 
from multiple subsystems at lower levels. This knowledge subsequently constrains lower-
level processes. The proposal of rapid high-level learning with top-down consequences at 
lower levels may seem provocative in the context of numerous theories of child 
development, which is usually presented as a slow bottom-up process. An important, 
open question concerns whether hierarchical, parallel, multileveled learning begins in 
infancy. 
Although current findings from brain imaging studies of infants describe frontal 
activations, these activations may only occur at the top of a hierarchy of processing. 
However, this proposal is compatible with the structural hierarchy observed prenatally in 
primates (Price et al., 2006), and Emberson et al. (2015) just published a study revealing 
that expectation of a stimulus produces top-down activations extending down to the 
sensory cortices of 5- to 7-month-old infants. In this study, infants were habituated to 
audio-visual pairs of stimuli with occasional trials in which the visual stimulus following 
the sound was omitted. An occipital activation was still recorded with NIRS in these 
particular cases, which was similar to the activation recorded when the visual stimulus 
was present, whereas no such activation was observed in a control group that did not 
receive any audio-visual pairs but only visual or auditory stimuli. Unfortunately, frontal 
areas were not monitored, but this study provides an initial test of the validity of 
hierarchical models and the role of top-down modulation in early learning. 
Ultimately, we may also be able to investigate at what age conscious access to a 
stimulus is possible and what advantages result from this access. Even if the structural 
architecture is in place (Price et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2012; Dubois et al., 2014), its 
immaturity may impair an adequate flux of information to allow external stimuli to be 
consciously available. This question is difficult to answer without verbal report, but one 
workable experimental approach is to define the functional properties of the neural 
responses underlying conscious access in adults and then test for responses sharing the 
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same property in infants. Several experimental paradigms in adults using ERPs have 
correlated the elicitation of a P300 with the verbal report of having consciously noticed a 
stimulus. By contrast, earlier components such as the mismatch negativity in auditory 
oddball paradigms are still recorded in sleep and even in some comatose patients 
(Bekinschtein et al., 2009). Thus, the experimental conditions generating a P300 in adults 
can be used to test infants’ neural responses, and the functional equivalent of the P300 
might operate as a proxy for the evaluation of consciousness in infants, even before term. 
Using this approach, a hierarchy of neural responses can already be demonstrated during 
the first months of life, but with notably delayed late responses, around 1 second (Basirat 
et al., 2014; Dehaene-Lambertz and Dehaene, 1994). These late slow waves may 
correspond to adults’ P300. For example, Kouider et al. (2013), recording ERPs in infants 
who looked at faces presented above or under their visual threshold, reported two types 
of responses (Figure 4B). First, the P400, a classical ERP response to faces in infants, 
showed a linear increase of amplitude and duration with the duration of the face 
presentation. Second, a late slow wave was observed only for supraliminal face 
presentations, showing an all-or- none effect similar to the nonlinear increase of 
amplitude of the P300 when adults perceived masked stimuli (Del Cul et al., 2007). This 
response was weak, starting around 900 ms, at 5 months but was more sustained and 
visible from 750 ms at the end of the first year. These findings suggest that the cerebral 
bases of conscious access are already in place during the first year of life with a clear 
frontal component. We may speculate that this conscious access serves to amplify the 
sensory input for infants (see Emberson et al., 2015, reported above) as it does for adults 
(Dehaene, 2014), but at a much slower speed than in adults. 
 
A New Dimension in Brain Architecture: Left-Right Hemispheric Asymmetries 
One significant feature of the mature human brain lies in its asymmetric structural 
and functional organization, with language primarily dependent on the left hemisphere 
and social cognition on the right. In fetuses and infants, structural asymmetries are 
observed along two dimensions, first in the anatomy and second in the maturational 
calendar: the Yakovlean torque that pushes the right hemisphere above and in the front of 
the left hemisphere, twisting the superior temporal region, is observed in the fetal brain 
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(Figure 5). The larger left planum temporale (Geschwind and Levitsky, 1968) and the 
recently described superior temporal asymmetrical pit (STAP), a deeper segment of the 
right superior temporal sulcus at the basis of Heschl’s gyrus (Leroy et al., 2015), emerge 
in the fetal period (Dubois et al., 2008; Glasel et al., 2011; Habas et al., 2012). Because 
the structure of the white matter tracts alters the movement of water molecules, diffusion 
tensor imaging sequences can be used to study the cerebral fasciculi (Figure 1C). Two 
major tracts that sustain asymmetrical human functions, the cortico-spinal tract 
(handedness) and the arcuate fasciculus (language), have a higher left than right 
fractional anisotropy in adults (Bu¨ chel et al., 2004) and also in infants studied during 
the first trimester of life (Figure 5C) (Dubois et al., 2009, 2015; Liu et al., 2010). Because 
infants of this age have very poor motor and verbal production capacities, these findings 
demonstrate that these asymmetries are pre-existing and not caused by functional 
development. 
The second dimension of hemispheric asymmetry concerns the developmental 
regional calendar: sulci usually appear one or two weeks earlier in the right than the left 
hemisphere (Chi et al., 1977). This structural feature, combined with a larger right 
hemispheric cerebral blood flow at rest (Roche-Labarbe et al., 2012) and larger right 
hemispheric hemodynamic responses to stimulation (Mahmoudzadeh et al., 2013), has 
been interpreted as an advance in development of the right hemisphere. T2w MRI signal 
is sensitive to the free water present in voxels. It darkens during the first year of life as 
myelination and the proliferation of membranes due to synaptogenesis decrease the 
proportion of free water in the gray matter voxels. Using this feature to quantify 
maturation in the gray matter at the voxel level, Leroy et al. (2011) report a faster 
maturation in the right relative to left superior temporal regions during the first months of 
postterm life (Figure 5B), but the inferior frontal region presents a reversed tendency (left 
frontal in advance of right frontal). 
In the white matter, myelination thickens the axonal tracts and makes them more 
hydrophobic. It constrains water molecules to follow the fibers and thus decreases the 
transverse diffusivity and increases the fractional anisotropy, two parameters measured 
with diffusion tensor imaging MRI sequences. Once these indices are normalized by the 
adult values to get rid of geometrical differences between tracts, it is possible to study 
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maturation per se and compare the left and right tracts during development. Beyond the 
structural differences highlighted in the previous paragraph, the left arcuate fasciculus 
matures faster than the right (Deoni et al., 2011; Dubois et al., 2015) (Figure 5C). 
Furthermore, Leroy et al. (2011) showed that maturation in the arcuate fasciculus 
correlates with the maturation of area 44 in the inferior frontal region and of the posterior 
part of the superior temporal sulcus. Because these three structures are the key elements 
of the phonological loop in adults, these findings complement fMRI findings showing a 
functional verbal working memory at 3 months of age (Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2006). 
Thus, human infants benefit from a memory buffer of several seconds to process speech 
and other environmental events. 
Do these hemispheric differences have a functional counterpart (Figure 5D)? A 
left advantage of the planum temporale to process speech or speech-like stimuli (i.e., 
containing fast transitions) is present from birth on, whereas the right temporal region is 
more sensitive to the spectral dimension (Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2002, 2006, 2010; 
Perani et al., 2010; Shultz et al., 2014; Telkemeyer et al., 2009; Wartenburger et al., 
2007). This particular sensitivity of the left posterior temporal region to fast temporal 
transitions is already observed at 6 months of gestation (Mahmoudzadeh et al., 2013), 
that is, at the onset of the cortical circuitry, suggesting a strong genetic influence on these 
hemispheric functional biases. Gene transcription analyses have revealed transient 
asymmetries in gene expression in the perisylvian areas before 19 wGA (Johnson et al., 
2009; Sun et al., 2005). In adults also, genes with a neuronal expression are 
asymmetrically expressed notably in the superior temporal region (Karlebach and 
Francks, 2015). Regional patterning of gene expression is established at birth in rhesus 
monkeys, and thus probably in humans. Indeed, in human fetuses, Johnson et al. (2009) 
have underlined the particular genetic pattern of the perisylvian areas, clustering together 
areas that are subsequently involved in language and speech processing in the superior 
temporal, inferior parietal, and inferior frontal regions. 
 Other functional asymmetries have been described, in particular concerning 
numerical cognition. The intraparietal sulcus is the main activated region observed in 
adults manipulating quantities (Dehaene et al., 2003), and lesions to this area impair 
numerical competencies both in adults and in preterm children having suffered from 
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anoxic lesion (Isaacs et al., 2001). Interestingly, parietal responses in adults are biased to 
the right hemisphere when nonsymbolic stimuli are used and when manipulation of 
quantities is involved but to the left hemisphere when symbolic aspects of numbers are 
accentuated (Chochon et al., 1999). In 3.5-month-old infants, a model of the sources of 
the electrical scalp responses to a change of numerosity also reveals a right fronto-
parietal network (Izard et al., 2008). The right parietal sensitivity to a change of number 
in a set of visual objects was further confirmed by an NIRS study in 6-month-olds (Hyde 
et al., 2010). 
With age, the involvement of the left inferior parietal regions increases, 
decreasing the initial right bias, as shown by the same fMRI paradigm used in 
kindergarten children and adults (Ansari and Dhital, 2006; Cantlon et al., 2006; Rivera et 
al., 2005). Pinel and Dehaene (2010), studying a cohort of 209 adults, reported a 
significant colateralization of the posterior superior temporal sulcus activation during 
sentence processing and of the intraparietal sulcus activation during arithmetic. These 
observations are congruent with the hypothesis of a progressive involvement of the 
linguistic system in the development of symbolic number knowledge, thanks to more 
direct connections in the left hemisphere between an initial approximate representation of 
quantities in the intraparietal sulcus and the strongly left-biased verbal system. It is 
interesting to note that for arithmetic, infants are more lateralized than adults, refuting the 
classical idea of an initial equipotential brain (Elman et al., 1996). 
It is still too early to understand the role of these functional asymmetries, why 
they have been accentuated in the human species, and why they are expressed so early in 
life. Published studies have only examined a few systems and have described only a few 
features of the structural and functional development, but already these examples 
underline an interesting feature of the human brain: a new left-right dimension has been 
added to the anterior-posterior and dorsal-ventral gradient of maturation observed in 
other mammalian brains. This third gradient, together with the extended period of 
development, provides a higher complexity of interactions between areas developing at 
different speeds and between these areas and the external world. It highlights how the 
brain is parceled in humans relative to other animals, an observation similarly underlined 
in studies of gene expression during brain development (Johnson et al., 2009). 
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Exploring the Possible Role of Maturational Tempo	
To summarize, developmental cognitive scientists have demonstrated that the 
human infant possesses numerous and complex cognitive abilities. Brain imaging studies 
bolster these reports by showing an early specialization of the infant brain in specific 
networks computing particular representations. These networks are not limited to low-
level regions but involve amodal associative areas in the frontal and parietal lobes even 
before term, when many neurons are still migrating to their final location. Moreover, in a 
given task, the set of activated regions is close to what is observed in adults: even left-
right asymmetries are already observed. Thus, there is strong continuity between brain 
organization in human infants and adults. However, if the neural architecture is in place 
early on, regional differences in rates of maturation (cf. the patchy colors of the brains in 
Figure 1B) may strongly affect network dynamics, yielding different computational 
properties and behavior. 
Infants are notably slower than adults but not consistently. The latency of the 
visual P1 increases from 300 ms at birth to 100 ms (adults’ latency) around 12 weeks, 
whereas the late slow wave that is thought to be the infant equivalent of the P300 is far 
slower at the end of the first year, with a poststimulus latency of about 700–1,000 ms 
(Kouider et al., 2013; Nelson and deRegnier, 1992) (Figure 4). The temporal constraints 
within the same architecture are thus highly different in infants and adults, a dimension 
that is often neglected in models of development. This temporal heterogeneity between 
networks may explain some behavioral paradoxes in the developmental literature. For 
example, infants sometimes fail to respond to the number of objects in a set when the 
objects in the numerically smaller set are larger in size (Feigenson et al., 2002). This 
failure does not stem from a lack of numerical competency (amply demonstrated by 
numerous studies; see Numerical Cognition) but might be related to a faster computation 
of object size relative to number, driving the behavioral response. Consistent with this 
possibility, infants’ number representations suffer more than their size representations 
under conditions of brief presentation (Brannon, 2002). 
The differences in the timing of neural responses in different regions of a growing 
brain may shed light on impairments to children’s cognitive abilities. In a parallel and 
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hierarchical, multileveled space, in which hypotheses are constantly and gradually 
revised according to new evidence, representations that are computed rapidly may gain 
an advantage over those computed more slowly. They may be favored until maturation 
compensates the lag in the initially slower networks. However, because the space of 
hypotheses, and thus the priors, have already been modified by the previous history, the 
temporal configuration change might lead to different outcomes at different times. For 
example, the response to a change of voice at 30 wGA appears less mature than the 
response to a change of phoneme (M. Mahmoudzadeh, F. Wallois, G. Kongolo, S. 
Goudjil, and G.D.-L., unpublished data). We may speculate that the small advance in the 
maturational calendar favoring temporal over spectral auditory processing before term 
might serve to strengthen representations based on the subtle temporal features of the 
speech signal, before statistics on other features are taken into account. Pondering the 
weight of environmental features through maturational lags at precise spots of the neural 
architecture might be an easy way to genetically control a ‘‘growing mind.’’ The 
parcelization of gene expression in the developing human brain (Johnson et al., 2009) has 
provided evolution with multiple occasions for testing the most adapted equilibrium 
between the computational possibilities offered by a given neural architecture and the 
learning opportunities proposed by the usual species environment. 
In early brain lesions, developmental disorders, and abnormal environments (e.g., 
sensory deficits, premature birth, etc.), the expected equilibrium is disrupted, and the 
space of hypotheses is shaped according to the evidence provided by the distorted input 
and/or distorted networks. The resulting behavior might be judged inaccurately by an 
external observer but it is correct given the hypotheses generated within the altered neural 
space, leading the child’s cognitive development away from the normal path. The 
developmental situation differs from that of lesions to a mature brain, where error signals 
can be produced by different brain areas due to the sudden lack of inputs from the 
damaged regions. The neuropsychological models proposed for adults should be adapted 
to take account of this temporal dimension. Our approach is not constructivist, for we 
view both human and animal cognition as determined by species-specific neural 
architecture. Learning is limited and favored by the local computational competencies of 
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each brain area, by their connectivity, and also by temporal constraints in a physical 
organ. 
Information on this dynamic architecture can be gained through careful 
exploration of children whose development leads away from the normal developmental 
path. One of the most provocative illustrations of a learning limitation due to unbalanced 
timing is Fattal et al. (2011), showing that a thiamine deficit during a few weeks during 
the first year of life is sufficient to cause later syntactic deficits at 9 years of age without 
global deficiency. On the 62 tested children, 56 had difficulties with syntactic structures 
comprising a movement. Thus, correct exposure to a normal language and the correction 
of the nutritional deficit (initially due to an insufficiently enriched milk formula) long 
before they began to produce sentences were not sufficient for the children to recover 
normal linguistic development. 
 Other examples can be drawn from comparisons of healthy preterm infants’ 
performance to those of full-term infants either of the same postmenstrual age or with the 
same duration of ex utero life. In a series of experiments, Pen˜ a and colleagues showed 
that the loss of sensitivity to suprasegmental and segmental features of a foreign language 
that normally occurs during the first year of life was not dependent on the duration of 
exposure to broadcast speech (Pen˜ a et al., 2010, 2012). In contrast, sensitivity to the 
phonotactic rules of the native language varies with the duration of postnatal experience 
(Gonzalez-Gomez and Nazzi, 2012), as do a number of visual functions including 
binocular perception (Jando´ et al., 2012) and gaze following (Pen˜ a et al., 2014). These 
variations should not be viewed as inconsistent but as pertinent dissociations shedding 
light on how these computations are realized in vivo. They may provide crucial evidence 
of the elementary computational elements of human cognition. 
 
Conclusions 
Much remains to be learned about the complex circuitry that underlies early 
developing cognitive functions and about its dependence on maturational/genetic and 
environmental factors (see Box 1 for the current status of the field and Box 2 for future 
directions). Future research will require both methodological developments to obtain 
better images of the active brain in healthy infants and carefully designed cognitive 
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paradigms. We conclude by emphasizing five points. First, humans are the only species 
that masters systems of explicit symbols, beginning with the words of their language. 
Thus, we are distinguished by our symbolic minds. The continuity between the brain 
architecture of infants and adults suggests that infants have the cerebral resources to 
develop symbolic representations across a wide variety of domains. Research in brain 
imaging in infants remains difficult and should be actively supported if we want to 
understand the symbolic functions that are so central to our human cognitive specificities 
and to develop adequate simulations of those functions.  
Second, we need a better understanding of the central features of human cognition 
in adults, coupled with a distinctive set of behavioral and brain signatures that afford 
exploration of those cognitive processes in nonverbal organisms. With such signatures, 
investigators can search for similar signatures in infants, despite the characteristically 
longer latencies of responses in young brains. We have given several examples of the 
similarities between infants’ and adults’ responses in both behavioral and brain imaging 
experiments, and of the insights to which these similarities lead. As understanding of 
developing brain systems deepens, we expect that the critical signatures of any given 
cognitive function will become both clearer and more specific, enriching and deepening 
our understanding of human brain and cognitive development.  
Third, because infants have a smaller and less educated brain with different 
physical properties (e.g., weak myelination), infants represent a crucial bridge between 
animal and human adult research to separate the genuine specificities of the human brain 
from extraneous features related to brain size, education, and culture. 
Fourth, we have emphasized the role of research in adult cognition and brain 
function in elucidating the early development of these functions, but the reverse 
relationship is equally important: an understanding of adults’ cognitive capacities and 
brain functions will be illuminated by studies of early development. For example, long-
standing motor theories of speech, and more recent theories of embodied cognition, are 
challenged by findings of the early perceptual capacities of human infants. More 
positively, studies of cognitive functions that emerge in infancy and that contribute to 
later cognitive achievements shed light on the nature of those achievements, the 
mechanisms that subserve them, and the pathways through which they arise. 
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Fifth, improving education remains a challenge to allowing healthy individuals to 
obtain full advantage of their possibilities and to help the 10%–20% of children suffering 
from developmental cognitive impairments. Our societies cannot leave behind such an 
important percentage of children, in a world in which adults’ professional and familial 
future is so strongly influenced by their academic achievements. All these arguments 
plead for a strong support of research on neural and cognitive development. We can only 
be surprised, if not worried, to note that none of the world’s major brain projects has 
considered development as a major topic so far. 	
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Box 1 'what we know' 
• A complex structural and functional architecture is visible and reacts to the 
external world with precise patterns of brain activation from the last 
trimester of gestation. 
• Sophisticated cognitive functions are observed in diverse domains, with 
developmentally invariant signature features. 
• Learning occurs throughout development at multiple, hierarchically 
organized levels of organization. 
 
 
Box 2 'what we need to know' 
• Processing depth of the infant functional architecture and the role of 
frontal regions in top-down learning. 
• Role of language (and of the future linguistic network) in the development 
of symbolic representations and high-level cognition. 
• Computational models of early infant cognition and learning taking into 
account realistic neural parameters based on brain imaging data. 
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Figure 1: Images of human brain development. A) Folding of the cortex: 
Gyration essentially develops during the last trimester of gestation (inner cortical surfaces 
obtained from MR images, Dubois et al, 2008). B) Gray matter maturation. The 
normalized T2w signal is projected on 3D reconstructions of the inner surface. The 
primary areas (central sulcus, Heschl’s gyrus and occipital pole) are the most mature 
areas (yellow). Note that the inferior frontal region is relatively more mature than the 
middle temporal region during the first months of life (Leroy et al, 2011). C) White 
matter maturation. Myelin stain in post-mortem brains (Flechsig 1920) illustrates the 
progression of myelination of tracts during the first trimester (first row). On the left, axial 
diffusion tensor images (DTI) obtained at different ages. Diffusion tensor imaging 
provides several parameters sensitive to myelination. Myelination decreases diffusivity, 
notably transverse diffusivity (the white matter becomes darker and bluer), and increases 
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fractional anisotropy (FA, the white matter becomes whiter). The direction of the main 
tensor eigenvector is coded in colour (red: right-left, green: antero-posterior, blue: 
inferior-superior). On the right, tractography of long-range association tracts in a 6-week-
old infant and an adult reveals similar architecture at these ages (Dubois et al, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Preterm brain organization. Oxyhemoglobin responses to a change of 
phoneme and a change of voice in 30wGA preterm neonates, measured with NIRS. The 
syllables were presented in alternating blocks of 20 sec (black rectangle) followed by 40 
sec of silence. In standard blocks (ST), the same syllable was repeated and in deviant 
blocks, a change of syllable occurred 3 times (phoneme, ba to ga, in DP blocks and voice, 
male to female, in DV blocks). The left inferior frontal region responded only to a change 
of phoneme whereas the right responded to both changes. The colored rectangles 
represent the periods of significant differences between the deviant and the standard 
conditions in the left and right inferior region (black arrow) (Mahmouzadeh et al, 2013).  
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Figure 3: Frontal activations in 2-3 month-old infants. Different frontal areas 
are activated depending on the task. A) A stronger activation is recorded in right 
dorsolateral prefrontal regions when awake, but not sleeping, infants listen to their native 
language (Dehaene-Lambertz et al, 2002). B) Activity increases in Broca’s area when a 
short sentence (blue rectangle on the plot) is repeated (Dehaene-Lambertz et al, 2006). C) 
fMRI responses to the baby’s own mother’s voice (green line in the plots) or to an other 
mother’s voice (blue line). The median prefrontal and the orbitofrontal regions showed 
significant differences between the voices but in opposite directions, congruent with 
adults’ responses to familiar/unfamiliar stimuli (Dehaene-Lambertz et al, 2010).  
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Figure 4: Age effect on ERP latencies. The latency of the visual N1P1 
accelerates during the first weeks of life due to the rapid maturation of the visual system, 
illustrated here by the responses to faces in two infants recorded on the lateral posterior 
electrodes (A) whereas higher-level responses remain slow, even at the end of the first 
year (B). Because of their functional properties, the N290 and P400 are considered as 
equivalent to the adult N170 and the late slow wave of the adult P300. In this experiment, 
in which masked faces were presented to 12-15 month old infants, the amplitude of the 
P400 varied linearly with the duration of the face presentation whereas the late slow wave 
showed a non-linear response depending on the visibility threshold, interpreted as the 
neural signature of conscious access to the visual stimulus (Kouider et al, 2013). The 
heterochrony in neural processing is one of the main differences between infant and adult 
cognition.  
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Figure 5: Early asymmetries. A) The human brain typical macrostructural 
asymmetries, notably a larger left planum temporale and a deeper right temporal sulcus 
(called STAP), are observed beginning in the fetal period (from Dubois et al, 2010; Li et 
al, 2013 and van Essen, 2005). B) The torque pushing the right hemisphere above and 
front of the left (blue arrows) can be seen on the dorsal view of the two individual 
infants’ brains. The maturation of the right hemisphere is generally faster than the left 
during the first trimester of life as can be seen here in the superior temporal sulci and on 
the average index of maturation of the same structure plotted in the right column. These 
measures are based on the normalized T2w signal, which darkens as the free water 
decreases (Leroy et al, 2011). C) Fractional anisotropy (FA) increases with the 
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myelination/compactness of the tracts. It is higher in the left lower part of the cortico-
spinal tract and in the parietal part of the arcuate fasciculus relative to the right during the 
first trimester (Dubois et al. 2009). D) Activation by speech is higher in the left than right 
planum temporale whereas it is symmetric for music (Dehaene-Lambertz et al, 2010). 
The response to a change of number in a set of objects measured with NIRS is observed 
only in the right parietal region in 6-month-old infants (Hyde et al, 2010).  
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